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Abstract and Keywords
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a 
groundbreaking work in democratic theory. This chapter argues that it is of continued 
relevance today, due both to its methodological innovations and its use of those 
innovative techniques to solve the fundamental problem of democratic justification. In 
Calculus, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock fuse economic methods, political theory, 
and the normative project of showing how democratic institutions of a particular sort can 
be justified contractually, creating a unique form of democratic contractualism that came 
to be known as “Constitutional Political Economy” and the more general research 
program of “Public Choice Theory.” Although these pioneering techniques have been 
integrated into mainstream political theory, the interest of their normative project has not 
been similarly appreciated.
Keywords: James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, contractualism, democratic theory, constitutional political economy, 
public choice theory
In the preface to The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (hereafter Calculus), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock describe their work 
as a “fence-row” effort, an attempt to work the soil closest to the disciplinary fence 
between political theory and economics (xv). But, as Peter Ordeshook has argued, 
Calculus was not mere working on the disciplinary boundaries, it “sought to destroy” 
them (2012, 424). The public choice school that Buchanan and Tullock launched with 
Calculus, along with the spiritually similar work of William Riker and his followers, has 
largely accomplished the work of dissolving many of the disciplinary boundaries between 
economics and political theory.
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If this were all that Calculus accomplished, it would be critical in the history of political 
thought but not a classic in the sense that it should still be read and studied today. Its 
enduring interest is not in its methodological innovations, but rather in the more 
fundamental innovation of developing a formal democratic theory in a contractarian 
philosophical framework anchored in comparative institutional analysis. As we hope to 
show, there is still much to learn from this analysis.
The Foundations of Democratic Justification
Calculus advances new methods in an attempt to solve an old problem: the problem of 
democratic justification. While democracy claims to be the “rule of the people” in any 
actual democratic system we actually find the rule of some people over others. More 
formally, the winning coalition in any election is able to impose its authority on the losers. 
This is true however large the majority happens to be, and however small the minority is, 
unless the vote is unanimous; and even then, there may be an excluded minority of those 
who did not or could not vote. Yet at the heart of the democratic ideal is the principle that 
all are inherently free and equal, with no natural authority to rule over one another. How 
odd then to start from freedom and equality and end with majority coalitions imposing 
their policies on minorities merely because they have the numbers to do so. Once we see 
this oddity we are confronted with the question: how could the authority of democratic 
assemblies over free and equal persons be justified? This is the problem of democratic 
justification, a problem that animates Calculus.
Buchanan and Tullock sought to solve this fundamental problem through a form of 
contractual constitutionalism. Their innovation is to do seek to do so without 
presupposing definite answers to enduring philosophical or ethical questions, such as 
whether more freedom or equality is better than less. Instead, they adopt a contractual 
framework that assumes only that individuals are rational: they will only consent to 
institutional rules that are likely to be as beneficial as any alternative. This allows 
Buchanan and Tullock to model unanimous consent as a contractual agreement on rules 
that everyone in society would have reason to endorse. By modeling democratic 
justification contractually, Buchanan and Tullock also capture the idea of “rule of the 
people,” without invoking any conception of a “general will.”
This point helps to identify what Buchanan and Tullock see as the proper target of 
agreement: the rules by which we will make future decisions, a constitution. Their 
rational individuals know that they will need rules, enforcement mechanisms, and a way 
to make new rules or change old ones. The meta-rules that govern each of these can be 
understood as the fundamental constitution of a society. The key elements of their 
approach then are: (a) the assumption of rational individualism and (b) the linking of 
unanimity as a democratic concept with the economic concept of Pareto efficiency (14). 
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Surprisingly, these weak assumptions produce a conclusion for a unique constitutional 
system based on super-majority rules.
Logrolling and Contractarianism
A feature of Calculus typically missed is its optimism. Public choice theory is commonly 
characterized as anti-democratic, or as undermining faith in the democratic process 
(Barry 1989; Christiano 1996, 2004). Rightly understood though, Calculus is an almost 
giddy endorsement of democracy (of a specific form) in the face of what looked like dire 
prospects for democratic theory. In the wake of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it was 
unclear whether democracy could be rationally justified at all (Riker 1982). Many 
believed that Arrow had shown that no rule for collective social choice, no voting rule, 
could be both collectively rational and fair.
Buchanan and Tullock dissented from this mainstream interpretation of Arrow’s theorem 
in their pre-Calculus work. The error, they claimed, was at the heart of Arrow’s approach 
to understanding collective choice. It is a mistake, Buchanan argued, to think of 
democratic institutions as mechanism for aggregating individual preferences into some 
coherent collective choice (Buchanan 1954a, 1954b).  Collectives are not individuals and, 
as such, there is no obvious reason that they should be bound by the consistency 
constraints of individual rationality.  In later work Tullock pursued a different route, 
arguing that Arrow’s general possibility theorem was “generally irrelevant” because of 
the role that institutions, agenda setters, and, most importantly, logrolling have on 
making collective social choice possible (Tullock 1967).
Calculus developed these basic insights, applying a methodologically individualist 
analysis to collective choice, thus making pellucid the importance and dynamics of 
democratic practices such as logrolling. The starting point for political analysis is the 
sometimes cooperating, sometimes conflicting, wills and interests of individuals. The 
essential function of democratic institutions is to induce mutual gains by resolving 
conflicts through exchange. As Tullock argues in his appendix to Calculus, “logrolling 
eliminates the basic problem” of democratic aggregation, at least as it concerned Arrow 
and his predecessors (Tullock 1999, 333). Logrolling can introduce additional information 
about the relative intensity of preferences. This information can be used by individuals to 
trade a vote on an issue on which they have little at stake for a vote on a matter they care 
more about. The idea is that I will be willing to help you secure passage of proposal A, 
which matters little to me, if you help me secure proposal B. By linking votes on different 
issues, it is possible to find agreement by exchange where before there was none. This 
expands the possibilities of forming a winning coalition on any particular issue, changing 
the model of democratic aggregation from a static one of taking given binary preferences 
and generating a collective ordering (a model that Arrow showed would be either unfair 
or incoherent) into a dynamic process of adjustment and compromise wherein 
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preferences of different intensities over different issues can be linked though trade 
(Thrasher 2016). Here we have the beginning of what Buchanan would call “politics as 
exchange” (Brennan 2012).
Buchanan and Tullock commence by putting aside the traditional questions of political 
inquiry: “Political theory has concerned itself with the question: What is the State? 
Political philosophy has extended this to: What ought the State to be? Political ‘science’ 
has asked: How is the State organized? None of these questions will be answered 
here” (Buchanan and Tullock 1999, 3). They argue that they are not concerned with what 
“the State or a State actually is” or even what the state ought to be, but with “what we 
think a State ought to be” (1999, 3). Note they are not seeking to show what the state 
ought to be or do, full stop—a normative theory of the state from a sort of Archimedean 
perspective. Instead, the aim is to present a model of how “we”—the constituent 
individual actors, with their own goals and concerns—could consent to rules that provide 
a framework for their interactions. Calculus is, first and foremost, an attempt to develop a 
method of justifying constitutional institutions to individuals who have no antecedent 
reason to endorse any particular constitutional structure. Political philosophy changes 
from a project of justifying the authority of the state, or one’s obligation to the state, to 
an understanding of how political rules can be based on consent, and politics transformed 
into exchange.
This constitutional focus is at the heart of the book’s distinctive contractarian method. 
Constitutions are the fundamental rules that govern collective choice, rules specifying 
how we make further rules. Contracting about constitutions is deciding how to decide. 
This contrasts with contemporary moral and political philosophy, which typically sees the 
contractual device as revealing what is truly, from the impartial perspective, just (e.g., 
Scanlon 1998). Calculus interprets the social contract in empirical and dynamic terms, 
about what types of constitutions can emerge given certain sorts of agents.
The striking innovation of this project is the cross-fertilization of democratic theory and 
contractarianism. Not only can a contractarian method show how democratic governance 
can be justified, techniques from actual democratic institutions (most notably logrolling) 
are shown to solve a thorny problem in contractarian theory. As Rawls later wrote, a 
“normalization of interests” is typical in social contract theories (2007, 226). That is, it is 
supposed that, to secure agreement, the diversity of the parties must be reduced. If the 
parties are too diverse, it is supposed, their disagreements will swamp the basis for 
contractual consensus. The social contract would thus seem impossible. To obviate this, 
Rawls homogenizes the utility functions of the parties in the original position by 
introducing primary goods, which all value the same (Gaus and Thrasher 2015). In that 
case, choice in the original position becomes functionally identical to the choice of one 
person over prospects. This approaches makes it possible to achieve “agreement” (there 
is, after all, only one person left!), but at the stiff price of the thorough homogenization of 
contracting agents.
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Buchanan and Tullock set out to show that a society composed of diverse individuals 
could find enough common ground to endorse at least one constitutional form; so they 
must avoid both (a) introducing so much diversity into the contractual process as to make 
agreement impossible and (b) securing agreement by homogenizing individuals. They 
navigate between these extremes by relying on logrolling, a core idea we have already 
considered. Logrolling allows one voter to offer “side payments” (deals about votes on 
other issues) to another, rendering agreement possible. Rather than being eliminated, 
diversity is commensurated through what amounts to political exchange. As in the market 
diverse interests and preferences are satisfied through trade.
In Calculus individual, often conflicting, wills and interests are thus the starting point. 
This “contractual turn” in political theory is a departure from what Buchanan calls the 
“organic” approach to politics, which takes the collective will or collective good as the 
unit of analysis. The question is how to identify the possibilities of finding agreement over 
the basic political institutions, rather than showing that a particular institutional 
arrangement is uniquely good by some external standard of goodness or utility.
Individualism and Constructivism
To understand how a “politics as exchange” justification of a democratic constitution 
works, however, we need to look at how the individuals—the parties to the agreement—
are modeled. Rawls’s method of “normalizing” disagreement leaves us with impersonal 
parties who are so similar that they can be modeled as a single rational chooser: the real 
problem of choice given diversity is abstracted away. Buchanan and Tullock need to show 
their contractarianism yields agreement without homogenization. Without this Calculus
will not be able to solve the problem of democratic justification.
It is critical to keep in mind that the problem of deep individual difference is part and 
parcel of their individualist approach. This problem does not arise on “an organic 
conception” of the state. “If an organic conception of the state is accepted, the theory of 
collective choice-making is greatly simplified. The collectivity becomes an individual, and 
the analyst need only search for the underlying value pattern or scale which motivates 
independent State action” (11). That is, a state conceived as a super-individual or entity 
not reducible to the individuals who make it up (11). There are many versions of such 
organicism in the history of political philosophy, but their references to “German political 
philosophers” and the “general will” suggest that they have in mind those influenced by 
Hegel and Rousseau (12). According to this version of organicism, individuals cannot be 
understood as existing outside of a social reality that reaches its perfect form in the 
modern nation-state. Buchanan and Tullock argue that this conception of the state is 
antithetical to the liberal tradition and especially to democracy. More generally, any 
conception of democracy relying on a “collective will” is suspect.3
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In Calculus the decision-making of a collective must be reduced to the individuals who 
compose it, and normatively, the value of the collectivity must be reduced to the 
satisfaction of individual purposes that rules and institutions promote. As Buchanan and 
Tullock argue, “analysis should enable us to determine under what conditions a particular 
individual in the group will judge a constitutional change to be an improvement; and 
when all individuals are similarly affected, the rule of unanimity provides us with an 
extremely weak ethical criterion of ‘betterness,’ a criterion that is implicit in the 
individualist conception of the State itself” (14, emphasis added). They thus develop a 
rational justification of a system of collective choice that is ultimately grounded only on 
the value of system to the individuals who employ it.
Articulating this individualistic contractarian standard requires an account of the 
individuals who compose their model society and their standards for rational choice: 
“[T]he separate individuals are assumed to have separate goals both in private and social 
action. The goals may or may not be narrowly hedonistic. … We need make no specific 
assumptions concerning the extent of equality or inequality. …” (15). The model does not 
assume “Homo economicus,” motivated solely by self-interest (17).  Their model of 
rational agency is more general, insisting only that agents prefer more rather than less of 
whatever they value.
Given this, the only possible justification of a political order is one that appeals to the 
rationality of those who are to live under those rules. Here we see an intimation of the 
public reason tradition developed by Rawls and others, or at least one important aspect of 
it. Individuals endorse rules because they view them as the least expensive way to 
achieve the collective and individual goods that social cooperation provides. Justification 
must appeal to individual rationality, not because of strong assumptions of moral freedom 
and equality, but because the individualistic postulate leaves us with no other possible 
justifications. This basic individualistic approach of Calculus applies to both the economic 
and political spheres: the political and economic agent is the same person. Calculus thus 
rejects a traditional assumption that in social or collective matters individuals are moved 
wholly or mostly by the public interest or common good.
Buchanan and Tullock insist this bifurcation of agency is untenable: it is psychologically 
unlikely that individuals can pivot from their individual point of view to a collective point 
of view (19). People are people and choices are choices, be they moral, political, or 
economic. Individuals will choose rationally, or rather we should model them as rational 
choosers, whatever the object of choice. The psychology of the individual should, 
according to Buchanan and Tullock, be invariant across different choice contexts.
This psychological claim is open to doubt. People often behave differently in different 
contexts (Nisbett and Ross 1991). A man may act and think differently, for instance, in his 
role as a father and as a citizen. Stanley Benn argues that this phenomenon is a central 
part of our moral psychology (1988, ch. 3). The important point, however, is not so much 
a matter of psychology but of rational consistency. A plausible model of human agency 
certainly should not suppose a sort of schizophrenia, acting in one way in private and 
4
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
Page 7 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2017
being another person in public. But this is only a problem if, as we have argued is 
mistaken, private individuals are assumed to be inherently self-interested, and they must 
shed their self-interest when entering the public arena. This thin model of rationality, 
taken largely from economic theory, allows both that one may rank various political, 
economic, moral, and personal outcomes in a variety of ways, and that this ranking, 
because consistent, can be represented as a unitary utility function.
To contextualize the utility functions of a chooser then will not necessarily render his 
choices inconsistent; it will though make the evaluation of the rational choice exceedingly 
difficult (Sen 1993). Constitutional choice is all about evaluating different contexts or 
institutional settings for rational choice. If the agent’s choices change substantially from 
context to context there will be no fixed point from which to evaluate the rational thing to 
choose in changing institutional contexts. To usefully model constitutional choice, it thus 
greatly simplifies matters to assume agents with fixed, decontextualized, globally 
consistent, utility functions. Rawls does the same thing by radically decontextualizing 
choice in the original position via the introduction of the “veil of ignorance.” Buchanan 
and Tullock introduce a “veil of uncertainty” in constitutional choice, leading choosers 
toward more general rules.  Because an individual will be uncertain about the effects that 
particular rules will have on him or his group in the future, “his own self-interest will lead 
him to choose rules that will maximize the utility of an individual in a series of collective 
decisions with his own preferences on the separate issues being more or less randomly 
distributed” (78).
Once we understand politics as simply a mechanism for diverse individuals to secure 
benefits, we immediately confront the inevitability of some seeking to benefit themselves 
at the expense of others. “It is precisely the recognition that the State may be used for 
such purposes which should prompt rational individuals to place constitutional 
restrictions on the use of the political process. Were it not for the properly grounded fear 
that political processes may be used for exploitative purposes, there would be little 
meaning and less purpose to constitutional restrictions” (13). Political institutions are 
thus understood as a “machine” or “artifact” that allows individuals to pursue their 
interests in collective choices. The regulative goal of designing such a machine is 
enhancing the outcomes for the individuals living under them, both in securing these 
goods and avoiding exploitation. Individuals bear the costs and capture the benefits of 
political institutions, so comparisons can only be made on the basis of the cost and 
benefits of outputs to individuals.
If rules are to effectively constrain behavior, rational individuals must conform to them, 
even when doing so thwarts their interests. This threatens the enterprise of Calculus with 
the traditional compliance problem for contractarian theories (Gaus 2011, ch. 2). 
Individuals may be able to rationally choose various rules on the basis of how those rules 
will benefit them, but it is a conceptually separate question whether they will find it 
rational to follow those rules once they are in place. Hobbes’s Foole is the classic example 
of someone who knows the rules and can see their point, but doesn’t see reason to 
comply when they instruct him to refrain from pursuing his interests. This compliance 
5
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problem plagued later contractarian theorists such as David Gauthier (1986, ch. 6), 
leading him to introduce a revisionist conception of individual rationality—one that 
guaranteed that rational individuals would not follow the example of the Foole. Buchanan 
and Tullock do not take this revisionary route; insofar as they address this issue at all, 
they assume that compliance can be ensured by institutional incentives and punishments, 
changing the payoffs so that even Fooles will usually see the wisdom of compliance.6
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Consent and Efficiency
Calculus judges a proposed political system or reform to be “optimal” if all would endorse 
the system or reform as an improvement. We are thus led to the familiar Paretian 
conception of efficiency in economics, but given a revised interpretation in the political, 
constitutional context. In traditional economic theory, institutions are taken as given, 
exogenous, constraints and the evaluation of optimality proceeds from that starting point. 
If a change in allocation improves the condition of at least one person by her own lights 
without making anyone else worse off (by their lights), the change improves efficiency (it 
is Pareto superior); when no such changes can be made, the allocation or state of affairs 
is efficient (it is Pareto optimal). This approach is inappropriate in comparative 
institutional analysis, however, because in this context we cannot assume that the change 
in allocations takes place against fixed institutional background conditions. Indeed, it is 
changes in those very institutional parameters that the individual is evaluating. The 
Pareto standard in Calculus is thus merely a representation of voluntary or consensual 
choice: if all would agree to move from constitution A to B, then B is Pareto superior.
It is not supposed that individuals value efficiency in itself; they do not choose an option 
because it is efficient—it is not an individual or collective goal. A constitution is Pareto 
optimal simply because no other feasible constitution would be chosen by everyone (or, 
somewhat more precisely, there is no other feasible constitution which at least one person 
would choose to adopt and to which all others are indifferent). This demand for unanimity 
expresses a respect for individuals and their aims: no collective decision is justified if it 
renders any individual worse off.
The manifest problem is that the decision costs of securing unanimity are excessive. 
Achieving unanimity in any deliberative body has high “transaction costs”: individuals 
have an incentive to strategically hold out or form coalitions to improve their bargaining 
power. Calculus shows how we can capture many of the benefits of unanimity without 
incurring these costs. This solves the problem of democratic justification by showing how 
every person in a given society would choose a constitution that operationalized 
unanimity. The key here is that collective choice procedures impose costs as well as 
delivering benefits. A simple majoritarian rule makes it relatively easy to collectively 
decide, say, to secure a public good, but the majority might secure much more of the good 
than some minority desires, leaving the outvoted minority with additional costs in terms 
of higher taxation or borrowing to purchase more of a good than they wanted—a sort of 
forced purchase. On the other hand, if the rule makes it too hard to reach agreement, we 
incur high negotiation costs, which might be so high as to entirely block securing the 
public good. In order to balance these costs, Buchanan and Tullock maintain that rational 
individuals would unanimously agree to endorse a non-unanimous collective choice rule—
but not the majority rule. This leads us to one of the most famous graphs in political 
philosophy:
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We see that if N voters are 
required for passage 
(unanimity) the “external” 
costs that one group can 
impose on another are 
zero: if everyone must 
agree, then we are assured 
that if there is any move it 
will be Pareto superior. But 
the “internal,” decision-
making, costs are very 
high. If we wish to 
minimize both costs, we should adopt a “k rule,” where k is typically greater than N/2 +1 
but less than N. That is, a super-majoritarian collective choice rule.
Calculus’s defense of a super-majority rule for collective choice can be seen as an attempt 
to devise a workable approximation of unanimity—what might be called “practical 
Paretianism” (Gaus 2011, 538–545). Much of Buchanan and Tullock’s analyses of 
logrolling and bicameralism are exercises in practical (approximate) Paretianism. The 
other side of this practical Paretianism is a rejection of simple majoritarianism. We can 
see from Figure 1 that there is no reason to think that net costs will be minimized at N/2
+1, majority rule. According to Buchanan and Tullock, “majority rule has been elevated 
to the status which the unanimity rule should occupy” (1999, 96). Like Kenneth May 
(1952), Buchanan and Tullock argue that there is one and only one uniquely justifiable 
collective choice rule.  Unlike May, however, the rule they justify is not simple 
majoritarianism. At best, they argue, majority rules should be seen as a possible 
alternative to unanimity only if the “cost of securing widespread agreement” on 
contentious political issues is especially high (96). Importantly, as they later show, 
“without side-payments, there is nothing in any particular voting rule to insure collective 
decisions will move the group to the Pareto-optimality surface or that such decisions will 
keep the group on this surface once it is attained” (189). In this context, a “side-payment” 
is some additional advantage that “sweetens” the initial deal for some parties, raising 
them at least to the level of indifference between any proposed change and the status 
quo. Majority voting, or indeed any form of voting, cannot be justified along Paretian lines 
without the possibility of side-payments or logrolling. Indeed any voting rule (including 
dictatorship) that involves full side-payments leads to Pareto optimal collective decisions. 
That is, given a large enough package of side-payments any collective decision, no matter 
how many external costs are imposed, can be choice-worthy so long as the side-payments 
offset the external costs of the decision. This trivially follows from requiring full side-
payments, but it is nevertheless enlightening.
From the point of view of Paretianism, the mechanics of a voting system are not as 
important as system’s distribution of costs. If all costs must be compensated the system 
will always tends toward Pareto optimality; if costs need not compensated, it will not. An 
implication is that any non-unanimity rule will tend to impose uncompensated costs on 
Click to view larger
Figure 1  Buchanan’s and Tullock’s Cost Curves
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some individuals: all such rules allow the losers to bear uncompensated costs. Here 
again, we see the conceptual link between the institutional unanimity rule, the Pareto 
standard, and consent. This point becomes more important when we look at the 
institutional evaluation of different collective choice rules.
Constitutional Political Economy
The central model of Calculus constitutes an answer to the question: “when will an 
individual member of the group find it advantageous to enter into a ‘political’ relationship 
with his fellows?” (43–44). Note that Buchanan and Tullock do not ask when collective 
action should be pursued, or when we should engage in collective action, but when an 
individual will think it is valuable or rational to resort to politics.
An important feature that distinguishes Buchanan and Tullock from their contemporaries, 
especially Rawls and Harsanyi, is their “cost model” of collective choice. When engaging 
in collective action a rational individual seeks to maximize net benefits: to secure the 
maximum benefits at the minimum feasible costs, involving both decision-making and 
external costs (44). One may want to decrease the costs that other individuals may 
impose through activities like theft is by hiring police. This reduces the external costs 
imposed by other individuals—one of the “externalities” of social life. One may also want 
to secure a benefit that is difficult or impossible to achieve alone, for instance a public 
good like clean water or improved roads. The central question of Calculus is how to 
minimize the cost associated with collective life for each individual in society through 
collective choice rules or, better, constitutional rules embodied in institutions.
This approach is importantly different from the traditional way of justifying collective 
action found in most contractarian theories. These theories tend to model justification as 
a rational choice based on the relative benefits of competing alternative regimes of rules 
or collective choice procedures. In the Rawlsian original position, for instance, the choice 
of ideal regime types is based on the attractiveness of the system’s distributive outcomes 
as judged from the view of a representative person’s (and her descendants’) life 
prospects, as measured in terms of “primary goods,” such as income, wealth, and 
opportunities. In their different ways the contractual choice procedures of John Harsanyi 
(1958, 1982), David Gauthier (1986), and Ken Binmore (1994, 1998, 2005) also take up 
this ideal distributive perspective. The problem, as Buchanan and Tullock point out, is 
that purely distributive variations in institutional frameworks cannot be evaluated by a 
unanimity rule (201). Individuals can evaluate a proposed change only given some 
starting point in utility space; they cannot meaningfully evaluate two different possible 
utility spaces (or distributions) from “nowhere” in terms of Pareto optimality. A starting 
point must be picked—we can only go up or down in reference to a baseline. Any Pareto-
superior move is justified, but a move from one Pareto optimal distribution to another will 
be worse for someone.
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Buchanan and Tullock’s analysis commences with zero costs on the choosing individual: 
political association imposes no costs on them. This is their baseline for evaluating 
whether individuals have reason to want to engage in collective choice. The cost model 
claims that individuals will choose institutional collective choice rules (constitutions) that 
will be most likely to reduce the costs that others can impose on them while maximizing 
benefits from collective action. As we saw a unanimity rule tends to prevent the 
imposition of external costs in collective choice, but the process itself is costly. Majority 
rule externalizes costs from the decisive majority to the minority (and generally 
oversupplies collective goods, the costs of which the minority must partly bear). The 
optimal rule minimizes both types of costs and will, therefore, be uniquely justifiable to 
rational individuals, supposing that they cannot be certain whether they will be in the 
majority or minority. Any political decision to move from one state of affairs (which entails 
a distribution) to another inevitably involves the creation of costs as well as benefits: the 
aim of constitutional choice in Calculus is to devise rules that allow individuals the 
opportunity to pursue the benefits of collective action while, as far as possible, 
minimizing the costs.
Anarchy is expensive, but so is leviathan. Calculus seeks a middle path between these two 
extremes that can complete the Madisonian task of establishing constrained institutions 
of collective choice. Buchanan and Tullock seek to do so through “politics as 
exchange” (Brennan 2012). If suitably constrained by Pareto-approximating institutions, 
politics is mutually beneficial, creating positive “gains from trade” that the possibility of 
peaceful social life allows. Constitutions that allow for politics as exchange provide a 
framework for mutually beneficial improvements, and obtain consent from rational 
individuals living under them. The normative project that comes out of Calculus is to 
employ the Pareto criterion to evaluate whether institutional structures are 
improvements from the status quo or a no-cost baseline. Buchanan and Tullock thus 
present a plausible claim to have solved the problem of democratic justification: each 
person in a society, no matter how diverse, will have reason to endorse and follow one 
and only one type of constitution, one that implements the unanimity rule in the way that 
they have described.
Conclusion
Calculus’s project is to solve one of the deepest and thorniest problems of political theory, 
that of democratic justification. It has been, and remains, a controversial project. 
Calculus was instrumental in launching the constitutional political economy research 
program that has borne fruit in political science, economics, and political theory. A large 
part of the current work in public choice is dedicated to showing the benefits and 
drawbacks of various institutions from the point of view of unanimity. This is practical 
Paretianism in its most detailed and sophisticated form. This approach to political theory 
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and political economy follows directly from Buchanan’s claim that political theorists 
should not tell us “what the state should be” but instead should develop a positive theory 
that can work hand in hand with normative evaluation. In Calculus, Buchanan wrote:
Normative theory must be erected upon and must draw its strength from the 
propositions of positive science, but it is only when this extension of normative 
theory is made that “reform” in existing institutions can be expected to emerge 
from specialized scholarship. Indeed the only purpose of science is its ultimate 
assistance in the development of normative propositions. We seek to learn how the 
world works in order to make it work “better,” to “improve” things: this is as true 
for physical science as it is for social science (306).
Even if one disagrees with the substantive claims in Calculus, and even if one isn’t 
confident that Buchanan and Tullock successfully solved the problem of democratic 
justification, the method and approach to political theory on display in Calculus is its true 
legacy. Despite the fact that much of has been incorporated into the mainstream, there is 
still a tremendous amount one can learn from Calculus.
References
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. Revised Edition. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Barry, Brian. 1989. Theories of Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benn, Stanley I. 1988. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Binmore, Ken. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 1: Playing Fair. 
Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
Binmore, Ken. 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 2: Just Playing. The MIT 
Press.
Binmore, Ken. 2005. Natural Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey. 2012. “Politics-as-Exchange and the Calculus of Consent.” Public 
Choice 152(3–4): 351–358.
Buchanan, James. 1954a. “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets.” Journal of 
Political Economy 62(2): 114–123.
Buchanan, James. 1954b. “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market.” Journal of 
Political Economy 62(4): 334–343.
Buchanan, James and Geoffrey Brennan. 2000. The Reason of Rules, Vol. 10: The 
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Stanford: Liberty Fund Inc.
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
Page 14 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2017
Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. 1999 [1962]. The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Volume 3 of the Collected Works of James 
Buchanan. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Christiano, Thomas. 1996. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic 
Theory. Boulder Colo.: Westview Press.
Christiano, Thomas. 2004. “Is Normative Rational Choice Theory Self-Defeating?.” Ethics
115(1): 122–141.
Gaus, Gerald. 2010. “The Limits of Homo Economicus: The Conflict of Values and 
Principles.” In Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common 
Research Projects, edited by Christi Favor, Gerald Gaus, and Julian Lamont, 37–68. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Morality and Freedom in a 
Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 2012. “Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality.” 
Episteme 9(3): 245–254.
Gaus, Gerald. 2018. “It Can’t Be Rational Choice All the Way Down: Comprehensive 
Hobbesianism and the Origins of the Moral Order.” In Tensions in the Political Economy 
Project of James M. Buchanan, edited by Peter Boettke, Virgil Storr, and Solomon Stein. 
Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center.
Gaus, Gerald and John Thrasher. 2015. “Rational Choice in the Original Position: The 
(Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi.” In The Cambridge Companion to The Original 
Position, edited by Timothy Hinton, 39–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harsanyi, John. 1958. “Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.” Mind, July, 305–316.
Harsanyi, John. 1982. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior.” In Utilitarianism 
and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 39–62. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
List, Christian and Philip Pettit. 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status 
of Corporate Agents. New York: Oxford University Press.
May, Kenneth O. 1952. “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for 
Simple Majority Decision.” Econometrica 20(4): 680–684.
Nisbett, Richard E. and Lee Ross. 1991. The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of 
Social Psychology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
Page 15 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2017
Ordeshook, Peter C. 2012. “The Calculus of Consent: Reforming Political Science.” Public 
Choice 152(3–4): 423–426.
Rawls, John. 1958. “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67(2): 164.
Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Edited by Samuel 
Freeman. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Riker, William. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory 
of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Reissue. Long grove, Il: Waveland Press.
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1993. “Internal Consistency of Choice.” Econometrica 61(3): 495–521.
Thrasher, John. 2016. “The Ethics of Legislative Vote Trading.” Political Studies 64(3): 
614–629.
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 81(2): 256–270.
Tullock, Gordon. 1999. “Theoretical Forerunners.” In The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, 326–350. The Collected Works of James M. 
Buchanan. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Notes:
( ) Arrow responds in the second edition version of Social Choice and Individual Values, 
arguing that Buchanan has misunderstood him and that his “confusion” is the result of 
substituting “verbal quibbling for genuine argument” (Arrow 1963, 107, n42). The 
consensus seems to be that Arrow is correct in this respect. Notably though, Amartya Sen 
agrees with Buchanan that an external “collective rationality” condition was an 
assumption of Arrow’s original theorem (Sen 1993, 503–504).
( ) Interestingly, recent trends in social choice theory and political theory have started to 
argue in favor of viewing collectives as individuals and of attributing rationality 
constraints to their collective judgments, see in particular List and Pettit (2011). For 
criticism of this approach see Gaus (2012).
( ) They single out early social choice theory as resting on this mistake (12; see also 
Buchanan (1954a,b) and the text above). They also attack Marxist conceptions of politics 
as being based on a similar mistake, namely that politics is the vehicle for economic 
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( ) Buchanan is not always clear—or perhaps consistent—about this. In some works his 
motivational assumption is indeed identified as “Homo economicus” who is essentially 
self-interested (Buchanan and Brennan 2000, vol. 10, ch. 4). Cf. Gaus (2010).
( ) But compare Rawls (1958) where something like a veil of uncertainty is used as a 
functional equivalent for the later “veil of ignorance.”
( ) In later work, Buchanan is very concerned with the human ability to rationally follow 
social rules. He discusses the ability to make rules for one’s self as a form of self-
contracting, recognizing the inter-temporal problems of compliance that this ability 
creates (Buchanan 2000, 118–121; Buchanan and Brennan 2000, 83–91). See Gaus (2018)
for a discussion of Buchanan’s analysis of norm-based preferences.
( ) For May (1952), this only holds for two options.
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